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Introduction 
In this report, we will, for the most part, sidestep discussion of how “chimeras” and “hybrids” 
are to be defined and distinguished, by simply focusing on the UK’s regulation of the 
activities that CHIMBRIDS has identified as its concern. These are activities that involve “the 
fusion of human and non-human tissue and cells”, and include human/non-human 
 
 transplantation (i.e. xenotransplantation) 
 gamete mixing 
 somatic cell nuclear transfer (into an enucleated ovum) 
 zygote genetic modification 
 embryonic cell transfer/fusion. 
 
We will address each of these possibilities before addressing patent regulation and the wider 
ethico-cultural background of the UK regulatory position. 
 
Xenotransplantation 
Since xenotransplantation, at it broadest, involves the transplantation of non-human animal 
tissue or cells into human beings (or, at least theoretically, vice versa) and transplantation 
from one non-human animal species to another, it is open to regulation from both the non-
human animal side and the human side. 
 
On the non-human animal side, the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (the “1986 
Act”) regulates experimental or scientific procedures on the animals it protects if the 
procedures might cause the animal “pain, suffering, distress, or lasting harm” (s2(1)). It is 
clear that xenotransplantation itself and research into it falls within this regulatory framework 
to the extent that it involves a protected animal, is likely to have these effects on the animal, 
and is an experimental or scientific procedure. 
 
Protected animals are “any living vertebrate other than man” (s1(1)) and (as added by an order 
empowered by s1(3))
4, “any invertebrate of the species Octopus vulgaris from the stage of 
development when it becomes capable of independent feeding”. Mammals, birds or reptiles 
are protected also in the foetal, larval or embryonic form, but only from when “half the 
gestation or incubation period for the relevant species has elapsed” (s1(2)(a)). The Secretary 
of State may by order extend protected animals to cover invertebrates of any description or 
alter the qualifying stage of development specified in section 1(2)(a) (s1(3)). 
 
Immune rejection of alien tissues and cells is a serious problem surrounding 
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xenotransplantation. The breeding of genetically modified donor animals (usually pigs 
modified by the introduction of human genes at an early embryonic stage) is often mooted as 
a way of reducing the effects of this response. These techniques are regulated by the Act, 
because section 2(3) provides that anything done “for the purpose of, or liable to result in, the 
birth or hatching of a protected animal is also a regulated procedure” provided it might cause 
pain, etc. to the animal. 
 
The Act operates by a licensing system and an inspection system. Any person conducting a 
regulated procedure must hold a personal licence to apply the particular procedure to the 
animal in question (s3(a)). In addition, the procedure must be carried out in a licenced project 
(s3(b)) and in a place specified in the personal licence and the project licence (s3(c)). Animals 
may not be bred for use in a regulated procedure unless a licence to breed for this purpose has 
been obtained (s7(1)). 
 
Project licences may only be granted for a number of purposes, which include the prevention, 
“diagnosis or treatment of disease, ill-health or abnormality or their effects, in man, animals 
or plants” (s5(3)(a)). A licence also requires that the research purposes cannot reasonably 
practicably be achieved without using protected animals (s5(5)(a)). Regulated procedures 
used must involve the minimum number of animals, animals with the lowest degree of 
neurophysiological sensitivity, cause the least pain, etc., and be those most likely to achieve 
satisfactory results (s5(5)(b)). Licences are not to be granted for the use of cats, dogs, 
primates or equidae unless no other animals are suitable or other suitable animals are not 
practicably obtainable (s5(6)). Any discomfort or suffering must be kept to a minimum 
(s10(2)(a), by, e.g., appropriate use of anaesthetics or pain killers. 
 
Section 18 of the 1986 Act enables the Secretary of State to appoint inspectors with adequate 
medical and veterinary qualifications to advise the Secretary on various applications, and to 
visit research establishments (s18(2)). Section 19 sets up the Animal Procedures Committee 
(the “APC”) to, inter alia, advise the Secretary of State on matters falling under the Act 
(s20(1)). 
 
The APC has recommended that no licences should be granted “for production of embryo 
aggregation chimeras . . . nor hybrids which involve a significant degree of hybridisation 
between animals of very dissimilar kinds”.5 Moreover, since 1999, the Home Office has 
required all projects to receive local ethical review.
6
 
 
A number of offences are created by the Act and the perpetrator of these is liable to be 
imprisoned (for various terms depending on the offence), fined, or both (ss22–24). Offences 
include carrying out regulated procedures without a licence, knowingly permitting someone 
under one’s control to carry out a regulated procedure without a licence, re-subjecting animals 
to severe pain or distress in a regulated procedure when they have already been so subjected, 
re-using animals previously anaesthetised in a regulated procedure, and failing to kill animals 
that will suffer adverse effects of a regulated procedure. 
 
On the human side, until recently, regulation of xenotransplantation in the UK fell under the 
remit of the Xenotransplantation Interim Regulatory Authority (UKXIRA), set up under 
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Department of Health Guidance following reports published by the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics
7
 and the Advisory Group on the Ethics of Xenotransplantation
8
 (which was set up 
by the Department of Health). The decisions of UKXIRA were not directly legally binding, 
and Department of Health Guidance only controls medical activities taking place within the 
National Health Service (NHS).
9
 However, UKXIRA was disbanded on 12 December 2006 
and its guidance
10
 was replaced by new guidance.
11
 This defines xenotransplantation to 
 
mean any procedure that involves transplantation, implantation, or infusion into a human 
recipient of either live tissues or organs retrieved from animals, or, human body fluids, 
cells, tissues or organs that have undergone ex vivo contact with live non-human animal 
cells, tissues or organs.
12
 
 
Hence, while both porcine and bovine heart valves are currently implanted into humans, 
because they are treated before they are implanted so as to kill their cells, they do not count as 
xenotransplants. They are, however, regulated as medical devices by the Medical Devices 
Regulations 2002/618, implementing Council Directive 93/42/EEC and related Directives. 
 
At the time of publication of the new guidance, no xenotransplantation trials had been 
undertaken in the UK.
13
 The Guidance recommends that “all xenotransplant procedures be 
carried out with a research protocol approved by a research ethics committee” (REC) and 
proclaims that it is “extremely important” that such procedures take place “in a controlled 
research context”.14 The Guidance envisages three situations in which a xenotransplantation 
procedure may be performed in the UK.
15
 
 
First, xenotransplantation could fall within the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) 
Regulations 2004/1031
16
 (which implement Directive 2001/20/EC)
17
. If so, the procedure 
must be approved by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) 
and receive the favourable opinion of a recognised REC (Reg. 12(3)). Where the trial involves 
a genetically modified medicinal product, the relevant REC will be the Gene Therapy 
Advisory Committee (GTAC) (Regs 2 and 14(5)).
18
  
 
Second, the xenotransplant could constitute research involving NHS patients that falls outside 
of the Clinical Trials Regulations. This would also require the approval of a Research Ethics 
Committee (including the GTAC, if appropriate), but not the MHRA.
19
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 Third, whereas the UKXIRA policy required all xenotransplantation to be treated as research, 
the new Guidance recommends that it should be so treated but allows the possibility of 
experimental treatment outside of this context. In this situation, clinicians must obtain the 
approval of a Clinical Governance Committee as provided for in a Health Service Circular.
20
 
 
It is, therefore, of some regulatory importance to determine whether a proposed 
xenotransplant falls within the Clinical Trials Regulations. These Regulations apply to any 
proposed clinical trial of a medicinal product (including xenogeneic medicinal products). 
More specifically, an “investigational medicinal product” is defined as “a pharmaceutical 
form of an active substance or placebo being tested” in a clinical trial (Reg 2). The 
Regulations provide timeframes for the ethics committee to issue an opinion (Reg 15(10)) and 
the MHRA to determine whether or not to authorise the trial (Regs 18–20). Special 
authorisation procedures apply to medicinal products for gene therapy and somatic cell 
therapy, including xenogenic cell therapy (Reg. 19(1))
21
 and to medicinal products with 
“special characteristics”, defined to include products that have an active ingredient that is, 
contains, or is manufactured using a biological product of human or animal origin (Reg. 
20(1)(ii)).
22
 It follows that at least some xenotransplantation procedures fall under the 
Regulations. Xenotransplantation trials will come within the Regulations if they involve the 
use of a new pharmaceutical product, gene therapy/somatic cell therapy product, or medicinal 
product with special characteristics.  
 
Contrary to Fovargue
23
 we doubt that whole organs transplanted from animals or humans into 
humans will ordinarily be considered to be medicinal products. For a start, the UK 
Regulations must be interpreted in line with Directive 2003/63/EC. Part IV of Annex I of the 
Directive applies to “advanced therapy medicinal products”, defined as products that “are 
based on manufacturing processes focussed on various gene transfer-produced bio-modules, 
and/or biologically advanced therapeutic modified cells as active substances or part of active 
substances”.24 Such products include “xeno-transplantation medicinal products” (Annex I, 
Part IV, para 4). The Directive, therefore, does not treat removed (human or animal) organs, 
tissues or cells that are not manipulated after removal as medicinal products merely because 
they are implanted into a human body.
25
 Of course, the UK could bring procedures under the 
remit of the Clinical Trials Regulations even though not required to do so by EC Directives. 
However, we see no clear grounds for its having done so. The provision in the Clinical Trials 
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Regulations on which Fovargue relies (Reg. 20(1)(ii)) does not, in our view, support the 
conclusion that the Regulations go further than the Directives so as to treat unmodified whole 
organs transplanted into humans as medicinal products. If Regulation 20(1)(ii) is to apply to 
whole organs, then they must be medicinal products with an active ingredient that is of 
human or animal origin. A pig organ to be transplanted into a human is certainly something of 
animal origin, but the notion that it is an active ingredient/contains one simply by virtue of 
being a functioning organ requires an extension of the meaning that “active ingredient” has in 
pharmaceutical practice, which is the background for this area of regulation. Furthermore, if 
Fovargue is right then it surely follows that all, at least experimental, human to human 
transplantation must fall under the Clinical Trials Regulations as well, and this does not seem 
plausible. 
 
However, pending formulation of an explicit policy on this by the MHRA and possible court 
cases, all we can say with absolute confidence is that, insofar as xenotransplantation involves 
or constitutes delivery of advanced therapy xenogeneic medicinal products clinical trials of 
these products will be required by the UK’s Clinical Trials Regulations to obtain authorisation 
from both an independent ethics committee and the licensing authority (the MHRA) (Reg 12). 
Failure to meet these requirements is an offence under Regulation 49, punishable by a penalty 
consisting of a fine, a term of imprisonment, or both (Reg 52). Specifically, Schedule 1, Part 
2, paragraph 14 of the Regulations provides that the licensing authority and the ethics 
committee must agree that any “anticipated therapeutic and public health benefits justify the 
risks”, in order for a trial to proceed. 
 
The prospect of clinical trials involving xenotransplants being granted a licence at this time is 
small: the risk of xenozoonosis (the transfer of infectious diseases from donor animal to 
human recipient; also known as “xenosis”) is a constant and high risk factor, given the risks of 
a “lack of information about the infectious potential”26 (especially in porcine derived 
xenotransplants: the commonest type, due to the use of primates being considered 
“unacceptable”27) and the possibility of the “emergence of a new human epidemic or 
pandemic”.28 
 
It is also worth noting that, to the extent that xenotransplants fall under the Clinical Trials 
Regulations, it no longer matters whether or not the activity takes place within the NHS, and 
the requirement to submit to the system set up by the Xenotransplantation Guidance will, in 
effect, be legally required (because it is inconceivable, at least at present, that the MHRA 
would not require it to be complied with). However, it is also clear that, to the extent that the 
Clinical Trials Regulations apply, licences would be unlikely to be granted under them until 
the risks have been substantially reduced,
29
 because, unlike some other EU countries, where 
issues of human dignity are much to the fore, the main UK reservation about xenotransplants 
fairly clearly concerns these risks.
30
 
 
Of future relevance is the draft EU Regulation on advanced therapy medicinal products 
(which will amend Directive 2001/83/EC and EC Regulation 726/2004)).
31
 If adopted, this 
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will add additional regulatory requirements for gene therapy medicinal products, somatic cell 
(human and animal) therapy medicinal products, and tissue engineered medicinal products. 
 
 
Summary: 
 
 Contingent on the level of hybridisation, or the extent of the chimeric 
properties expressed, a licence may be granted under the 1986 Act for the 
modification of animals for the purposes of xenotransplantation 
 To the extent that it applies, licences would be unlikely to be granted 
under the Clinical Trials Regulations until risks have been reduced 
 
Human/non-human gamete mixing 
 
Human/non-human gamete mixing is directly regulated by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (the 1990 Act). This is currently being revised and a draft Bill (the 
Human Tissues and Embryos (Draft) Bill) has been issued.
32
 
 
We will, however, explain the extant situation before indicating the changes that the Bill 
proposes. 
 
Section 5 of the 1990 Act establishes the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (the 
HFEA). The HFEA, under section 9(1), has the power to discharge the “functions relating to 
the grant, variation, suspension and revocation of licences”, provided for within the Act. 
  
Section 4(1)(c) provides that to “mix gametes with the live gametes of any animal, except in 
pursuance of a licence” is prohibited. The only instance where such a licence will be granted 
is outlined in Schedule 2, paragraph 1(1)(f), according to which such a process would be 
permitted if its purpose is to test the “fertility or normality of the sperm”. However, the results 
must be destroyed at no later than the two cell stage. 
 
A recent report of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee recommended 
that legislation be passed clarifying the nature of hybrids and chimeras, making their creation 
legal for research purposes if they are destroyed “in line with the current 14-day rule for 
human embryo cultures” and prohibiting their implantation in a woman.33 This would 
represent a departure from the current rules surrounding this activity, insofar as embryos 
would be allowed to develop right up until the “primitive streak” stage or 14 days (whichever 
is the earlier), rather than by the two cell stage. 
 
The attitude towards this procedure in the UK is very sceptical, with current and proposed 
regulation only permitting it in a research setting, and providing “strong legal safeguards”,34 
which reflects “public disquiet about the prospect of creating hybrid embryos”.35 
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Summary: 
 
 No licence would be granted by the HFEA 
 
Changes Proposed by the Bill 
 
 The Bill proposes to replace the HFEA with a new organisation, the Regulatory 
Authority for Tissues and Embryos (RATE) (which will also replace the Human 
Tissue Authority, the responsible Authority for the Human Tissue Act 2004, and 
which will take over responsibility to regulate blood and blood products from the 
Medicines and Healthcare Regulatory Authority (MHRA) where this regulation is 
currently under the remit of the MHRA). 
 The mixing of animal and human gametes will still be prohibited except in 
pursuance of a licence (Clause 17(2), proposed s4A(2)(a)). As before a licence 
may be granted for testing the fertility or normality of sperm, in which case it 
cannot be kept beyond the 2-cell stage.
36
 It is proposed, however (new Schedule 2, 
para 3(3)) that regulations may extend the activities for which a licence may be 
granted for research beyond determination of the fertility or normality of sperm. A 
licence could be granted by RATE if deemed necessary or desirable for the 
purposes listed in a new Schedule 2, para 3A(2) or any other purposes specified by 
regulations (proposed new Schedule 2, para 3A(1). 
 It is proposed that a licence cannot authorise hybrid embryos to be kept or stored 
after the earliest of the following: the appearance of the primitive streak, 14 days 
from which the process of creating the embryo began, or half the gestation period 
of any species whose nuclear or mitochondrial DNA is involved (new s4A(3)). 
 
Non-human/human somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) 
 
The regulatory position regarding the transfer of either a non-human somatic nucleus into a 
human ovum or a human somatic nucleus into a non-human ovum is not entirely clear. That is 
because there remains some room for debate over the precise impact of the 1990 Act and the 
Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001 (the 2001 Act). 
 
There are many possible reasons why someone might wish to create a hybrid embryo using 
SCNT. One possibility is the creation of a child. Another is the deriving of “human embryonic 
stem cells, thereby circumventing the shortage of good quality human eggs available for 
research”.37 
 
The 2001 Act makes it a criminal offence (carrying a penalty of a fine and/or a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding ten years) to place in a woman a human embryo which has been 
created otherwise than by fertilisation (s1). Although the Act does not define “human 
embryo”, in our view, this provision would capture placing into a woman an animal egg that 
has had its nucleus replaced with that of a human cell.
38
 In any event, the 1990 Act prohibits 
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the placing in a woman of any non-human gametes (s3(2)(b)). 
 
The 1990 Act directly addresses the use of ova taken or derived from human embryos or 
foetuses. Section 3A
39
 renders it a criminal offence to use such ova for the purposes of 
providing treatment services, which would clearly encompass their use in a SCNT procedure. 
 
In the context of an animal nucleus being introduced into a human gamete, a licence would be 
necessary if the storage of human gametes is involved (s4(1)(a)). 
 
There has been considerable controversy over whether or not the transfer of a human somatic 
nucleus into an animal egg is covered by the 1990 Act. The 1990 Act requires a licence for, 
inter alia, the creation and use of human embryos outside of the body (ss1(2) and 3(1)). The 
Act says that, except where otherwise stated, “embryo” means “a live human embryo where 
fertilisation is complete” (s1(1)(a)), including “an egg in the process of fertilisation” 
(s1(1)(b)). In R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health,
40
 the 
House of Lords considered whether an entity created by SCNT using a human egg and human 
somatic cell fell within the 1990 Act. Their Lordships held that the 1990 Act was to be 
interpreted purposively and the purpose of the Act was to provide for the regulation of live 
human embryos created outside the body. The wording of section 1(1) was held not to 
exclude SCNT from the ambit of the Act. Lord Bingham(with whose speech Lords Hoffman 
and Scott agreed) held that the “essential thrust” of the s1(1)(a) was directed to “live human 
embryos created outside of the human body”, as opposed to “the manner of their creation”.41 
Lord Steyn treated the restrictive wording of that section “as merely illustrative of the 
legislative purpose”.42 Lord Millet held that s1(1) was not intended to define “the word 
“embryo” but rather to limit it to an embryo which is (i) live and (ii) human”.43 In other 
words, their Lordships ruled that s1(1)(a) was to be read as specifying no more than when a 
fertilised egg was to be regarded as an embryo.
44
 It follows that the creation of any living 
human embryo outside of the body, using SCNT or any other method, required a licence from 
the HFEA. Thus, the essential question for our purposes is: when is the product of trans-
species SCNT to be regarded as a human embryo? 
 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has stated that the 1990 Act “is silent on the combination 
of animal gametes and human somatic cells. It would be a matter for the courts to decide 
whether the embryo developing from such a hybrid cell was “human” and thus subject to the 
Act”.45 In contrast, the Center for Bioethics and Public Policy (CBPP) in its submissions to 
the House of Commons Science and Technology opined that, firstly, “[c]reating an animal-
human hybrid embryo is illegal under the [1990] Act”46 (while referring to the “fuse[ing] [of] 
an adult human cell with the enucleated egg of an animal”) and, secondly, that “[o]ther 
developments may, or may not come under current UK legislation, depending on whether or 
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not the entities created can be properly described as ‘human’” 47 such as, for example, the 
creation of human-animal hybrid embryos by implantation of a human somatic nucleus into 
an enucleated cow egg.
48
 
 
The confusion surrounding the “human vs. non-human” status of human/non-human hybrid 
embryos created by SCNT was one of the driving forces behind the House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee’s suggestion (with which the Government agreed) that 
the terms “hybrid” and “chimera” be defined in legislation. 
 
This suggested legislation has not yet been enacted, and so the question remains moot. A 
report chaired by the Chief Medical Officer, generally known as “The Donaldson Committee 
Report” suggested that the 1990 Act does not prohibit the mixing of human cells with animal 
eggs, but that it should,
49
 while the House of Lords Stem Cell Research Committee argued 
that an alternative view is that it is “more acceptable to use [a hybrid embryo] for research”50 
because it does not involve the use of human gametes. The House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee enjoins the reader to recall that the 1990 Act “aimed to give 
protection to the human embryo and not gametes or other forms of embryo”. However, while 
this last point is correct, it shirks discussion of what constitutes a “human” embryo, and thus 
an embryo subject to the protection of the 1990 Act. 
 
Our personal view is that that the courts should take a wide interpretive approach to this 
situation and hold that simply because (for example) an embryo contains the mitochondrial 
DNA of a cow and the nuclear DNA of a human, it is not “non-human” for the purposes of 
the Act. Similarly, a pig nucleus in a human egg would not give rise to something that was 
human enough to warrant the classification “non-animal”. In our opinion, it is contrary to the 
purpose of the Act to take the narrow view that a creature that is technically not wholly 
genetically human (regardless of the level of modification), should not be given the protection 
that a human is granted under the 1990 Act simply because its genetic make-up is not 100% 
human. What should, instead, be determinative is consideration of the characteristics that the 
creature that could develop from the resulting embryo would have in relation to the reasons 
why the Act protects clearly human embryos. In our view, the 1990 Act is based on the idea 
that (clearly) human embryos have a moral status that makes them worthy of a degree of 
moral concern and respect that increases with the degree of development of the embryo 
because embryos have the potential to develop into beings to which the law accords full moral 
status. Of course, what this property is (the property by virtue of which human beings have 
dignity, rights, are worthy of moral concern and respect, or simply have moral status or 
standing) is contested between moral theories (on which see more below). However, it is 
surely this consideration that should be decisive. Simply put, if the resulting embryo is 
capable of developing into a being with the characteristics that are deemed to be sufficient for 
clearly human beings to have full moral standing, then the embryos should be considered to 
be human. 
 
This, however, does not quite resolve the matter. First, it is not certain what characteristics the 
courts might hold to be determinate. Secondly, failing actually allowing such a creature to 
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develop and be born, it will not be possible to ascertain with certainty what characteristics it 
will have. However, on the latter point, it is arguable that where the human component comes 
from the somatic nuclear material, the resulting creature is likely not to be relevantly different 
from clear human beings. If this is so then it is also plausible that, barring making the 
determinate characteristic being 100% human genetically, whatever the relevant 
characteristics they will be shared by clear humans and the creatures in question. In any event, 
in a state of uncertainty, it is arguable that precaution should dictate that the benefit of the 
doubt be given to the embryos and that they should be protected by the 1990 Act in default of 
legislation on the matter. 
 
 Summary: 
Regulation depends on both intent and definition: 
 The 2001 Act prohibits this procedure if the intent is to implant the result 
into a woman and bring it to term 
 The 1990 Act prohibits the procedure if the egg used is derived from a 
human embryo, and is intended for fertility treatment 
 The HFEA would not grant a licence if the courts determined that the 
embryo was “human” for the purposes of the 1990 Act. It is at least 
arguable that the courts would hold (and we believe they should hold) that 
such a creature was human for the purposes of the Act. 
 
Changes Proposed by the Bill 
 The Bill redefines “embryo” and “gamete”. The new proposed s1(1)(a) 
states that an embryo is a live human embryo and does not include an inter-
species embryo (this being defined in proposed s4A(5), which is discussed 
further in the next sub-section). As in the existing Act, an embryo includes 
an egg in the process of fertilisation. However, it also includes an egg 
undergoing any other process capable of resulting in an embryo (proposed 
s1(1)(b)). The proposal could have been to define fertilisation as any 
process by which an egg is transformed into an embryo. However, the 
proposal is instead to follow the House of Lords in the Quintavalle case 
and hold that SCNT is not a process of fertilisation.
51
 “Gametes” (except in 
proposed s4A, where non-human gametes are included) include live human 
eggs (which include cells of the female germ line at any stage of maturity) 
and live human sperm, including cells of the male germ line at any stage of 
maturity (proposed s1(4)). Thus, in line with SCNT not being (for the 
purposes of the law) a process of fertilisation, enucleated eggs and somatic 
nuclei are not to be regarded as gametes in the context of SCNT process. 
(We detect some problems here. To begin with there is some circularity in 
the definitions. More importantly, perhaps, it could be argued that, 
according to these definitions, because an enucleated ovum is not an egg 
(or gamete), SCNT is not a process by which an egg is undergoing a 
process capable of resulting in an embryo. In our opinion, this can be 
responded to by viewing SCNT broadly to include the process of 
enucleation of the egg, in consequence of which SCNT does involve an egg 
undergoing a process capable of resulting in an embryo. This is, however, 
somewhat strained and could have been avoided by redefining 
“fertilisation”. In any event, the Bill proposes that the Secretary of State be 
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given powers to extend the definition of “embryo”, “eggs”, “sperm” or 
“gametes” in the light of developments in science or medicine (proposed 
s1(6)). This does not apply to non-human embryos, etc. (which fall under 
proposed s4A)). 
 Embryos etc. that contain any non-human nuclear or mitochondrial DNA 
are not to be regarded as human. This is contrary to the recommendations 
we have made above. However, those recommendations were made, in 
part, to ensure that hybrid and chimaeric embryos fell under the legislation. 
The Bill achieves that by having specific provisions relating to these 
interspecies embryos in the revised Act. 
 To improve the flexibility of the new legislation, proposed s4A(7) and (8) 
define non-human embryos etc. in a fashion that parallels the definitions of 
human embryos etc., and proposed s1(7) gives the Secretary of State the 
power to pass regulations to amend these in the light of scientific and 
medical developments.  
 
Human/non-human zygote gene modification 
Genetic modification of zygotes is regulated by the 1990 Act and the 1986 Act. 
 
The modification of a human zygote with animal genes would not currently be granted a 
licence under the 1990 Act. The term “embryo”, under the Act, includes the zygote (s1). 
Schedule 2, paragraph 1(4) does not permit treatment licences authorising altering the genetic 
structure of any cell while it forms part of the embryo and Schedule 2, paragraph 3(4) 
prohibits the extension of a licence for the purpose of genetically modifying any cell that 
forms part of the embryo unless this is permitted by regulations. 
 
The 1986 Act regulates the modification of animal zygotes with human genes. As previously 
stated, a licence would be granted dependent on the nature of the species involved and/or the 
extent to which such modifications are apparent: for example, a pig hybrid with “some 
‘human genes’” would be acceptable.52 
 
 Summary: 
 
 The HFEA would not grant a licence for this procedure 
 Possibility of a licence under the 1986 Act is dependent on the animals 
involved and the level of modification expressed. 
 
Changes Proposed by the Bill 
 
 Proposed s4A(2)(b) and (c) permit the creation, use and storage of inter-
species embryos in pursuance of a licence (up to the appearance of the 
primitive streak, 14 days, or half the gestation period of a contributing 
species, whichever is the earliest: proposed s4A(3)). Interspecies embryos 
are human embryos created by using animal and human gametes; by 
replacing the nucleus of an animal egg or a cell derived from an animal 
embryo with a human cell or nucleus; by altering a human embryo by 
introducing any sequence of nuclear or mitochondrial DNA of an animal; 
by altering a human embryo by introducing one or more animal cells; or 
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any embryos with both a haploid set of human chromosomes and a haploid 
set of animal chromosomes or any other animal nuclear or mitochondrial 
sequence of DNA (proposed s4A(5)). RATE, therefore, might grant a 
licence for this procedure. 
 
 
Human/non-human embryonic cell transfer/fusion 
This method of creating chimeras is regulated by the 1990 Act, the 1986 Act and possibly the 
Clinical Trials Regulations. 
 
There is, once again, controversy over whether or not this procedure is within the remit of the 
1990 Act. The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee has suggested that, 
despite the assertion by the Center for Bioethics and Public Policy (CBPP), that “the creation 
of new genetic human-animal chimeric embryos and foetuses, do not come under the HFE 
Act”,53 it is likely that the introduction of a non-human cell into a human embryo would 
constitute genetic modification of an embryo, which will not be granted a licence for either 
treatment under Schedule 2, paragraph 1(4) or research under Schedule 2, paragraph 3(4) of 
the 1990 Act. 
 
However, the Science and Technology Committee uses a narrow interpretation of the term 
“chimera” (provided by the Canadian Assisted Reproduction Act 2004, s3 of which provides 
that a chimera is “an embryo into which a cell of any non-human life form has been 
introduced”), whilst the examples cited by the CBPP in their submission of evidence (the 
implantation of human cells into mice embryos
54
, pig embryos
55
 and sheep embryos
56
) refer 
only to the implantation of human cells into animal embryos. The 1990 Act is concerned with 
human embryos, and does not regulate the modification of non-human embryos with human 
somatic cells. 
 
The 1986 Act, however, does regulate non-human embryos. The APC recommends that no 
licences should be granted “for production of embryo aggregation chimeras”57 and goes on to 
state that “there seems to be no particularly good reason to create [trans-species chimeras]”.58 
 
That a clinical trial involving, for example, stem cells derived from human/non-human 
embryo aggregation chimeras in order to treat serious diseases,
59
 would be granted a licence 
under the Clinical Trials Regulations (assuming that they apply) is far from certain. The 
reason for this it two fold. First, all applications for licences must be passed by an ethics 
committee (Reg 12(3)). Secondly, under the Regulations (as amended), clinical trials must “be 
scientifically sound and guided by ethical principles in all their aspects” (Sch. 1, Part 2, para 
3), including the principles of the 1996 version of the Declaration of Helsinki (Sch. 1, Part 1, 
para 2 and Part 2, para 6). 
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 Ethics committees might be reluctant to approve chimeric experiments. It has been argued 
that “intentionally creating compromised human beings or part-human beings might appear to 
‘all the world’ as failing to treat the creature as an end in itself, a use that has been confirmed 
as morally unacceptable since at least the Declaration of Helsinki”.60 However, the concept of 
dignity invoked by the idea of “an end in itself”61 is a contested one, and in the UK tends to be 
linked more closely to the idea of autonomy than in some other EU countries; and when so 
linked (as it was in the philosophy of Kant, himself, from whom the idea is derived) 
instrumentalisation is only forbidden when it involves treating a person as solely a means to 
the needs of others and not at the same time as an end in itself.
62
 
 
However, much is likely to depend on just what the nature of the hybridisation or production 
of a chimera would involve. Specifically it will depend on whether or not it would create a 
being with the moral characteristics of human beings (on which see the last part of this paper). 
This is a philosophical issue and goes beyond the mere definition of the term “chimera”. 
Thus, although the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee request for 
clarification of the term “chimera” is understandable, by itself this would do nothing to 
address the ethical issues that underlie different regulatory stances. 
 
 Summary: 
 The HFEA would not grant a licence if the embryo to be modified was 
human 
 No licence would be granted under the 1986 Act 
 It is by no means certain that permission to conduct research creating 
human/non-human trans-species chimeras would be granted by an Ethics 
Committee under the Clinical Trials Regulations (if they apply). 
 
Changes Proposed by the Bill 
 
 Proposed s4A(5)(d) brings such chimeric embryos under the remit of the 
Act. Therefore, the procedure could be granted a licence by RATE. 
 
Patent Regulation 
An important aspect of the regulation of hybrids and chimeras is the ability, or inability, to 
patent the techniques for creating such creatures, as well as the creature themselves. Given 
that patent regulation affects each of the above activities in very similar ways, rather than 
include a discussion of its impact under each of the headings, which would be somewhat 
cumbersome and repetitive, it is discussed separately. 
 
A patent is not a positive right: it does not grant the owner of a patent the right to create or 
exploit the invention, merely a right to prevent third parties from doing/creating the 
thing/process that has been patented. For example, if it is possible under the current regulatory 
regime to patent chimeric or hybrid creatures (or the techniques used for their creation), this 
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would not, by itself, enable the patent holder to exploit such an invention, as use (and, indeed, 
development) might be regulated or even prohibited by other regulatory rules. Conversely, an 
inability to patent such creatures/techniques does not mean development or use of the 
creatures or techniques in question is impermissible. However, this itself does not render the 
issue of patents irrelevant, as the inability to patent a method/technique has a profound effect 
on the practical regulation of hybrids and chimeras in the UK: if one cannot patent one’s 
technique, then the incentive to proceed with research that could lead to the creation of these 
creatures is lessened. Thus the question remains: “is it possible to patent hybrids and chimeras 
in the UK”? 
 
Article 53 of the European Patent Convention 1973 (which was implemented by the UK 
Patent Act 1977) provides that patents shall not be granted for inventions, the publication or 
exploitation of which is contrary to “ordre public” or morality. With slight modification, this 
is mirrored in Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, 
Article 6(1) of which states that “[i]nventions shall be considered unpatentable where their 
commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality”. With reference to 
Article 6(1), Article 6(2) of the Directive gives examples of inventions that are “in particular” 
excluded, viz., 
 
(a)  processes for cloning human beings; 
(b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; 
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; and 
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them 
suffering without any substantial benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting 
from such processes. 
 
In addition, Recital 38 states that “processes, the use of which offend against human dignity, 
such as processes to produce chimeras from germ cells or totipotent cells of humans and 
animals, are obviously also excluded from patentability”. 
 
Furthermore, Article 7 of the Directive states that “[t]he Commission’s European Group on 
Ethics in Science and New Technologies evaluates all ethical aspects of biotechnology”. It is, 
therefore, to be noted that this Group (the EGE) has declared that the “dignity” of the human 
being should be protected and that chimeras and hybrids are an offence to that dignity and 
should not be permitted.
63
 
 
Directive 98/44/EC was implemented in the UK by the Patents Regulations 2000/2037, which 
amended the Patents Act 1977.
64
 Regulation 3, implementing Article 6(1) of the Directive, 
provides that “[a] patent shall not be granted for an invention the commercial exploitation of 
which would be contrary to public policy or morality”. Schedule 2, paragraph 3(b)-(e) 
duplicates Article 6(2)(a)-(d) of the Directive, but there is no reference in the Regulations to 
the exclusion of chimeras from germ cells or totipotent cells of human and non-human 
animals mentioned in Recital 38 of the Directive. There is also no indication that the 
exclusions of Article 6(2) are examples only, as the words “in particular” are not reproduced 
in the Regulations.  
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Ethical Climate and Background to UK Regulation 
 
The UK is a very multicultural society and there is no consensus or even dominant ethical 
position amongst the population. However, it is clear that regulation of the use of embryos 
and foetuses, the UK’s abortion law, the 1986 Act, and background documents to the 
regulation of xenotransplantation, strongly suggest a particular view of the characteristics that 
confer moral standing or status on those beings that have it. This is at variance with the view 
taken in many other EU countries, particularly Catholic ones. Catholics are a small minority 
in the UK, but have been very organised and active in trying to have legislation changed so as 
to be more in line with their ethico-religious beliefs.
66
 Other religious groups have been much 
less vocal and organised in their attempts to influence legislation. 
 
In this final section, we will discuss this ethical background briefly. This, however, is not the 
only factor that must be taken into account in understanding the influence of ethics on the 
UK’s regulatory attitude towards chimeras and hybrids. The UK is well-known for it 
“pragmatic” approach to regulation, which probably owes much to the strong influence of 
utilitarianism in the UK. The secularisation of the UK and its long-established technology 
industry must also be taken into account in understanding the influences affecting regulation. 
 
In many EU countries, probably the principal ethical issue identified in relation to the 
chimeras and hybrids is that of dignity or, more specifically, human dignity. The concept of 
dignity does not explicitly play much of a role in the UK debate or regulation. However, if 
human dignity is thought of, as it is proclaimed in the Preamble to the UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, as that property by virtue of which human beings have 
fundamental rights and freedoms, then a view of human dignity is at least implicit in any view 
taken about what property or properties make a being worthy of moral concern and respect, 
and we consider that UK regulation of the area is much influenced by a view of this matter. 
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 To place the matter in context, it is worth listing some of the different views to be found in 
moral theories about the basis of moral standing. For example, various theories maintain that 
the property that is necessary and sufficient for a being to have moral status (to be owed moral 
concern and respect in its own right) is 
 
(a)  being alive; 
(b)  being sentient (having the capacity to experience pain/pleasure); 
(c)  being a member of the human species, biologically defined; 
(d)  being self-conscious (or having personhood); 
(e) being a rational agent (in the sense of having the capacity to act for reasons) (or as 
Kant described it, “a rational being with a will”);67 
(g)  having the potential to develop one or other of these properties; 
(h) having the potential to develop rational agency, or the past possession of rational 
agency, as well as the possession of rational agency itself within the context of a teleology. 
One example is the view that all human beings possess moral status as members of the 
human species, characterised, centrally, by possession of rational agency, because this 
must be viewed in the context of human beings existing only to fulfil God’s purpose. 
(i) being a vulnerable rational agent (which is our own position; vulnerability being 
necessary, because beings that cannot be harmed can hardly require the concern of 
others). (While this is probably taken for granted in most other views, one of us has 
argued elsewhere that it is worth taking explicit note of it, because attention to it has 
important implications for moral theory).
68
 
 
We take the view the best candidate for the position that has exerted the greatest 
influence on UK regulation is the view that full moral standing derives from being a 
rational agent coupled with the idea that a degree of moral standing is conferred by 
being a potential rational agent and the idea that the degree of moral standing is 
proportional to the degree to which a being approaches being a rational agent. This we 
maintain is implied if we are to make consistent sense of the following: 
 
 that the UK law permits abortion places greater restrictions on abortion at after the 24th 
week of development of the foetus than earlier;
69
 
 that the 1990 Act permits various procedures to be performed on embryos that are not 
for its benefit up until a particular stage of its development;
70
 
 that the philosophy of the Warnock Committee, which was directly influential in the 
enactment of the 1990 Act, was that the embryo has a special status as a potential 
human being that makes it worthy of concern and respect but is less than that of the 
born human being;
71
 
 the special protection given to primates and some other animals72 by Section 5(6) of 
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effected by the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act (Amendment) Order 1993, which 
gives special protection to Octopus vulgaris (most probably because of recognition of 
the intelligence displayed by this creature); 
 the comments of, e.g., the Kennedy Committee (instrumental in the setting up of 
UKXIRA, which until recently regulated xenotransplantation) that directly refer to the 
proportional standing of primates on account of their close approximation to the 
intellectual capacities of human beings.
73
 
 
This view best accords with preference utilitarianism (as against hedonistic utilitarianism),
74
 
contractarianism (sometimes called “contractualism”), and Kantian theories, and the former 
two are very widely accepted in at least academic philosophical circles in the UK. 
 
This position has an effect on the way in which various philosophical arguments are 
perceived. For example, it affects the force of arguments to the effect that cloning violates 
dignity by instrumentalising the cloned being.
75
 While instrumentalisation (treating a being 
solely as a means and not as an end in itself) will be prohibited, instrumentalisation will only 
be seen to occur if a being is treated as a non-autonomous agent. Since the being is only 
envisaged to have autonomy at the certain stage of development it cannot be instrumentalised 
before this stage, and so the question of instrumentalisation must be referred to how it will be 
treated after it reaches this stage.
76
 
 
This position also opens up the possibility of weighing the harms that could be said to be done 
to various beings in the practices that will produce chimeras and hybrids against the benefits 
and needs of other beings with moral standing in a way that cannot be regarded as proper by 
theories that accord full moral status to the beings in question. 
 
In general, this position opens up the way for a pragmatic and consequentialist way of 
approaching the issues that are not open within certain other positions. In general, cloning, the 
creation of chimeras, etc., will not be seen to be something to be prohibited at all costs, but 
something that could, at least in certain circumstances, be justified by overriding benefits to 
others. Consequently, much of the UK debate in this area has focussed on risks, the idea being 
that if various practices can be done safely or the risks attending them reduced, then they 
might become acceptable. And this, in turn, or so we are suggesting, correlates with the fact 
that much UK regulation is not directly prescriptive but sets up an authority to regulate the 
activity. 
                                                                                                                                                        
working animals. The explanation for this is possibly that the intelligence recognised in cats, dogs and 
equidae (and pigs) is not considered to be sufficient to grant special singled out protection to these 
categories and that those that are singled out are singled out in order to respect public sensitivity to domestic 
pets and working animals. 
73
  Advisory Group on the Ethics of Xenotransplantation, Animal Tissue into Humans (Department of Health, 
1997), p 65, where it is stated that while it is not ethically acceptable to use primates as sources of organs 
because of their close affinities to humans, it is ethically acceptable to use pigs. 
74
  Preference Utilitarianism gives standing (at least in the paradigm case) to beings capable of exercising 
choices, whereas Hedonistic Utilitarianism gives it to those capable of experiencing pain and pleasure. 
75
  See, e.g., the Explanatory Report to the Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine on 
the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings. For a critical commentary, see Deryck Beyleveld and Roger 
Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw, fn. 43 above, pp 158–164. See also Shaun Pattinson, 
‘Reproductive Cloning: Can Cloning Harm the Clone?’ (2002) 10 Medical Law Review 295. 
76
  See Beyleveld and Brownsword, ibid, p 161. 
 Finally, this position makes analysis of the influences of economic, scientific, and 
medical considerations more complex than it might otherwise be. In any country, these 
considerations create imperatives that can come into conflict with those based on purely 
ethical principle. However, from the perspective of the UK core ethical position as we 
have portrayed it, these imperatives can themselves be seen as ethical ones (reflecting 
the needs of agents), and the permissibility of considering consequences for other beings 
with status increases the force and permissibility of economic considerations (and 
reduces the necessity to see them as conflicting considerations in all circumstances). In 
short, this means that what is sometimes seen as the UK’s “pragmatic” rather than 
ethical approach can be portrayed as, if only in part (because we do not wish to suggest 
that the UK is not tainted by unethical attention to political imperatives deriving from 
economic and other imperatives), as, in fact, an ethical approach. It is just that the form 
and content of the ethical imperatives are, to an important degree and way, different 
from those in some other EU countries. 
 
 
 
